

Towards a New State of Mind

The prominence of the state in our three disciplinary knowledge structures provided the point of departure for our triologue. Moreover, in Chapter 1 we noted the symbolic and metaphorical underpinning of the central position of the state in scholarly as well as everyday discourses. In the course of our triologue we have brought insights from history, geography and political science to our common purpose of putting the state into perspective and exploring alternative modes of organizing European space. We have also suggested alternative metaphors that might improve our understanding of complex realities. Hopefully, our transdisciplinary approach has provided new perspectives, insights and understandings beyond those offered by the individual disciplines. We would like to see our chief contribution as suggesting novel linkages and raising new research questions rather than revealing hitherto unknown facts or furnishing definitive answers.

While we have been struck by the degree of consensus and compatibility across disciplinary boundaries that our triologue has revealed, our emphases may nevertheless differ somewhat. Therefore, we have decided to let the individual voices of the co-authors be heard in the final chapter. What kind of conclusions does our joint enquiry suggest to the historian, political scientist and geographer, respectively? Having related European historical experiences to current trends in the previous chapters, we now speculate about possible future developments and the mind-sets needed to understand them.

Territorial identity and historic legacy

The crossroads of history

To understand the present and evaluate alternative futures, we need knowledge about historical crossroads: which alternatives have existed in different periods, and why did Europe end up on the path it did? The historical perspective is also essential to a better understanding of the way humans have organized their existence in time and space, how and where their loyalties have been established, and how they have built their communities. The answer to these questions depends on the observer's vantage point and choice of approach.

In this book, we have focused on the interrelationship between the three basic concepts in its title, *Organizing European Space*. As for 'space', the fundement of this triad, we have primarily been interested in territory related to human beings, or 'human territory', rather than in physical-geographic or other aspects of the concept. Our study has also been limited to conditions and cultures within the boundaries of Europe, although certain conclusions may be applicable at the global level, particularly since European culture has had – and continues to have – worldwide influence.

The third defining – and at the same time confining – notion in our title concerns 'organization', a concept we use to analyse forms of control over the European territory. This control refers mainly to political controls and societal organization, although these cannot be treated as separate from other fundamental aspects, such as economy, religion and networks of communication. The terms 'organizing' and 'organization', as used in this book, imply a process perspective. The frequent use of 'organization' as a static concept – a 'frozen' process – is unsatisfactory for our purposes. In fact, our approach can be described as extremely process-oriented, insofar as it attempts to link a long-term historical perspective with present-day phenomena and to raise questions about the future.

The historical experiences that are highlighted have not been derived from any overarching theory, but have been selected to help bring concrete meaning to the four structural elements of our model of the 'territorial field of tension': state, region, union and network. Just as these vary in form and can be compared in a contemporary spatial context, a diachronic perspective provides a basis for comparisons in yet another dimension. This underlines our desire to juxtapose the two dimensions that are essential to all social science: time and space.

The point of departure for our analysis of territorial organization in Europe is the present, that is, the way Europe is organized today. As has become evident from the foregoing chapters, it is not easy to give an unequivocal description of complex realities. The fact that all the categories of the model exist in parallel – some reconcilable and perhaps even mutually reinforcing, others competing or perhaps even mutually exclusive – complicates the analysis. If the tendencies simultaneously point in different directions and appear with varying intensity, how are we to evaluate which path we are on?

To simplify, Europe today is characterized by overarching integration, as reflected in the European Union and its supranational organs and functions, on the one hand, and by fragmentation, as manifested in enduring national barriers and regional demands, on the other. These conflicting tendencies can be traced back to divergent views as to the optimal mode of organizing territory. The picture is complicated further by another development, which has called in question, or reduced the value of, territorial control at whatever level: the rapid growth in recent years of non-territorial networks.

The question of integration/fragmentation can be understood either from

a top-down perspective or from a bottom-up perspective. Organization reflects power relations and resources among central actors, whether princes, estates,

city oligarchies, parliaments or some other governing entity, depending on space and time. Territorial organization has not been determined only by economic, technical or military forces concentrated in the hands of specific élites or rulers, but has been shaped as well by the interests and loyalties of different groups. Successful exercise of power requires that rulers have secured a sufficient degree of legitimacy among the subjects, the citizens, or 'the people'.

In the rear-view mirror of history we can observe both the efforts of different actors and interest groups to design the most effective territorial organization, and the eternal interplay of individuals acting within or against existing structures. As discussed earlier, dramatic shifts in technical range often run against the limits of the human mind, a factor that can be regarded as a constant in the short time perspective – a few millennia at the most – applied in this study. Thus, an enquiry into territorial identity inevitably draws attention to the values and mental frameworks of individuals and groups. To allude to a dichotomy that will be discussed later in this chapter, *human reach* then becomes more important than *technical range*, even if both dimensions are relevant in accounting for the genesis of identities.

Territoriality is a function of the emotional intensity and geographical scope of people's anchorage in space, on the one hand, and of the institutionalization of territorially based patterns, on the other. Moreover, the formation of identities is such a slow and protracted process that the individual is unlikely to experience any clear changes during his or her lifetime. Only in retrospect do transformations become discernible in this pattern of inertia. Naturally, attachment to one's place of residence and work has been important to all generations of Europeans throughout the two thousand years dealt with in this study. This is not to say that territory has played the same role in every place and at all times, nor that territorial control has always been equally significant. In looking for prominent patterns, we should note, first, that different patterns might emerge simultaneously in different places within the European cultural sphere. Moreover, development has not been unidirectional. Already in Europe's earliest history, we can discern varying degrees of loyalty to, and different extensions of, the territorial objects of identification.

strength and depth of which we cannot know today – appears to have been stratified hierarchically, with compatible and overlapping levels.

A similar pattern can be observed in the medieval city-states. A Venetian merchant, for example, was based in the city of Venice but had access to a far-reaching commercial network around the Mediterranean. The merchant felt no affinity to the coexistent principalities in the Mediterranean region, beyond purely commercial relations. This applied to commercial cities elsewhere in Europe as well. A Hanseatic merchant from Lübeck was based in his hometown, but had access to business offices in, for instance, London, an extraterritorial base. At the same time, he took part in a non-territorial network of like-minded colleagues in the Hanseatic League. For the average Athenian, Venetian or Lübeckian, territorial identity was in all likelihood unconscious or only weakly developed. An individual's loyalty was more likely to be to his family, his kin or the guild to which he belonged, and was thereby indirectly linked to the immediate territorial environment, the city within its walls. The city wall can be seen as a concrete expression of a conscious demarcation from surrounding territorial states and principalities. Entrance and exit took place through guarded gates and, for cities located by the sea, through the harbour or 'port', the linguistic origin of which is the Latin word for 'gate'.

The principality

Alongside the medieval city-states, there were social formations that rested on non-territorial ties and loyalties. The most common form of political organization and control was exercised by rulers of various ranks: feudal lords, kings, dukes, counts, tyrants, bishops and a number of other potentates, frequently in conflict with each other and with the city-states.

Principality is a collective label for the most common form of territorial control during most of the Middle Ages, up until the emergence of the modern state in the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance. People's loyalties were tied to their ruler and ruling family, rather than to defined territories, the configuration of which was liable to shift in connection with wars or dynastic activities. This is most evident in the case of the migration states in the middle of the first millennium, when popular loyalty was linked to a military leader rather than to any definite territory.

Over time, as the migration states gained permanence, both the ruler and the territory became part of the identification of peoples, a process that of course was encouraged by the rulers themselves. The medieval monarchies are the political entities that most successfully strengthened their position and eventually evolved into territorial states in the modern sense. Such territorial formations could vary greatly in scope, ranging from quite small units in terms of geographic size and population – historical regions, dynastic configurations and different types of functional entities – to large integration projects, such as France, Spain or Sweden, embryos of later nation-states.

The city-state

A few examples may illustrate the point. In classical Greece, the city-states, which were small in terms of population and territory, played a major political role as independent entities. While important, citizenship was granted only to free men – not to women, slaves or immigrants. At the same time, the Greek city-states were part of a pan-Hellenic cultural community unified by language. This meant that an Athenian could, in turn, participate in a military raid against Sparta and participate in pan-Hellenic Olympic games. He could also belong to a Greek commercial network through contacts with compatriots around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The identity of an Athenian – the

The nation-state

The nation-state – or national state – proved to be the most influential model for state-building in Europe, particularly after the principle of nationality gained currency and nationalism was promoted as an ideology in the nineteenth century. As is often noted, there was great discrepancy between ideal and reality, and true nation-states with perfect congruence between state and nation have been exceptions in the history of Europe. The principle of nationality thus has often played a destabilizing role in multinational states and in so-called part-nation states, which comprise nationalities residing in more than one state.

The principle of nationality had particularly important consequences for the multinational empires, which were unable to survive the convulsions of the First World War. The Wilhelminian empire was reduced to an ethnic German territory after the war, and the Habsburg domain was replaced by a number of small states based on the principle of nation-statehood, albeit imperfectly applied. Similarly, the Romanov and Ottoman empires were fractured into smaller units, often with new waves of instability as a result.

The European experience of large integration projects after the fall of the Roman Empire has hardly been felicitous. To be sure, the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation lasted over 800 years, but most of this time it existed in name only. And subsequent pan-European empires had far shorter life spans – Napoleon's survived for a decade and a half, Hitler's for only a few years.

Historically, the European nation-state has proven to be the most viable

form for the political organization of territory. The fact that states for two hundred years have occupied this unique position by no means implies that the system has been static, however. State-building, on the contrary, is a highly dynamic process. New states emerge, change, are fragmented, merge with others and decline. Multiple processes affect the life of any given state, not least in Europe.

In light of the development of the European Union, the question arises, whether the ethno-territorial states of Europe have played out their traditional rôle. Many claim that the strength and independence of the state is being eroded both from above, under the pressure of supranational governance, and from within or below, by various particularist forces. As its traditional power withers, the state will disappear altogether, the argument goes. Those lacking legitimacy and the confidence of their people will vanish first, and the others will follow as a consequence of the integrative momentum.

It seems premature, however, to declare the territorial state dead. All previous attempts to integrate Europe have founded on the opposition of powerful structures in Europe, on the diversity of the continent in regard to peoples, languages, cultures and political experiences. To be sure, states are today in the process of transferring decision-making authority in certain important issue-areas to the European Union (areas they in practice no longer control unilaterally; defence/security, economy/international regulation, etc.). But new tasks surface continuously, and in many of these the state retains

control over policy and implementation. Just as the princes in the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages retained the key control apparatus and tax collection within their domain, while the emperor lacked the resources to exercise overarching power; so it will be difficult for EU organs to take over and maintain the powers that historically have been exercised within the framework of the territorial states.

Territorial control has thus played a central role throughout European history, although it has taken varying forms. Modes of organization have been time- and culture-specific. Continued integration within the European Union and the emergence of supranational organs for economic and political control raise the question whether or not we are experiencing something qualitatively different and are entering an entirely new era of European history.

Networks

While territory has been a central part of societal organization, other patterns have always existed in parallel. In these non-territorial networks have played an equally essential role. The feudal system of enfeoffment rested on loyalty between lord and vassal, which in principle was not linked to any specific territory. A successful feudal ruler could build a net of fortified places, which were controlled by the lord in a hierarchical network where horizontal contacts between vassals were suppressed.

Other early historical networks were represented by the Catholic Church with its overarching ideology and its control over the channels of communication, primarily through the Latin language, which for several centuries was the *lingua franca* of European elites. The church controlled people's souls rather than their territories. However, this did not prevent the church from exercising power over people's material possessions, including land. A clearer alternative to both the feudal system and the territory-based social structure of the principalities was the medieval network of commercial cities that spread through most of Europe. A network of cities had existed already during Roman Antiquity; but only through the expansion of the Italian cities, resulting from the growth of long-distance trade in the tenth century, did such networks gain importance. The Italian city-republics could be viewed as islands surrounded by a sea of feudally organized society, and they were thus subjected to constant pressure. The city-republics were seldom stable. Indeed, their republican foundations often could be abolished by warlords and replaced with dictatorial rule under so-called tyrants.

The cities north of the former Roman Empire suffered similar pressures. Some were from the outset under the protection and control of princes, such as Hedeby and Birka, two major centres in the realm of Baltic commerce in the ninth century. In general, the princes could use their military resources to strengthen their influence, by offering 'protection' in exchange for taxes and tariffs, or 'extraction'. To some extent, the fortified walls of the city could protect its dwellers from such intrusions, but the lines of communication

between the cities, particularly by land, were too vulnerable for the network system to survive in the long run.

Regions and places

In present-day Europe, cities once again occupy a position that challenges established decision-making structures, essentially the traditional territorial states. Now more than ever before, resources – people, knowledge, capital and infrastructures – are concentrated to cities. Technological advances have reduced distances and improved accessibility to an unprecedented degree. The nodes of the IT society are linked quite regardless of geographic dimensions, such as distance and territories in between. Actors in modern networks no longer confront highwaymen, confiscatory customs duties, or insurmountable physical barriers. Rather, they are restrained primarily by human limitations; not even the most talented and well-educated individuals can reach beyond their given, comparatively limited abilities. If history teaches us anything, it is the paramountcy of people interacting with their environment, the human need for a palpable community, which encompasses families, friends, a residence and a workplace – a space in which the individual feels at home. This has remained true throughout the period dealt with in this study.

Despite inherent limitations to human capacity, Europeans throughout their history have exhibited a remarkable ability to organize and to adapt structures and organizations to constantly changing needs and conditions. European culture has been dynamic and expansive, both in terms of ideas, politics and economic power. Many of the original elements of European culture eventually became cornerstones of a wider phenomenon, generally called Western civilization. Although the forms of political dominance in the international system have changed in more recent times, much of the fundamental influence and advantage that Europe obtained through its global political and economic reach still remains. Thus, the impact of European culture and organization is not confined to the continent, but continues to be a global concern.

Power and accountability: the future of the democratic state

To a political scientist, two central themes suggest themselves in summarizing the evolution described and analysed in the preceding chapters, and in attempting to extrapolate into the future: (1) the dispersion of power, and (2) the multiplying problems of accountability. The first theme concerns competing authority claims and the future role of the state; the second alludes to the prospects for democratic governance under multi-layered complexity and globalization.

The power of the sovereign state, as we have seen, rested on extensive authority claims. The institution of sovereignty endowed states with 'meta-

'political' authority, insofar as states claimed the authority to relegate issues to the political realm where they were recognized to have ultimate authority.

This kind of exclusive authority is no longer for the state to claim. The evolution from the traditional sovereign state to the contemporary state, it has been suggested, represents a qualitative change similar to that of a lobster in the sea ending up on a plate: 'Their borders remain largely intact and their constitutions are in place, but the shells of these sovereign crustaceans have often proved too porous to prevent their contents from being cooked to someone else's taste.'¹

As is particularly graphic in Europe, the state is losing power 'upwards', to supranational entities, as well as 'downwards', to regional entities and transnational networks. It has been argued that the state has become too big for the little things and too small for the big things.² This reflects a widespread impression that the sovereign power of the state has been diluted and dispersed among other types of actors in recent times.

From state to market

Technological and economic factors are usually pointed to as the main determinants of this development, and 'globalization' is the buzzword used – and frequently misused – to capture their combined effect. The favoured manner of describing the power shift is to portray the state as the victim of the globalized market economy. Robert Cox, drawing on Karl Polanyi's work, describes a kind of cyclical movement in the relations between state and market.³ The early European states, from the fifteenth through the eighteenth century, were mercantilist; the pursuit of state power was carried out through the accumulation of economic power and wealth. States strove to regulate production as well as export and import and to control shipping. During the industrial revolution, the state gradually withdrew from substantive economic activity, leaving it to the presumably self-regulating market, while assuming the role of enforcer of the rules of the market.

Eventually states reacted to unanticipated socially destructive consequences of the self-regulating market by resuming its regulatory authority and guaranteeing a modicum of social equity, and in the twentieth century the welfare state was born. By the early 1970s this renewed pattern of state regulation seemed to have reached its limits. Stagflation and fiscal crises led to a deregulation movement around the world. The state abdicated from the economic realm in the same way it had done during the industrial revolution. The crucial difference is that now the economy is global, and the autonomous capacity of states to control their national economies and regulate their relationship to the external world economy has been reduced.

To some observers, this kind of historical sketch suggests an irrevocable change in the balance of power between states and markets: 'the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period more by private enterprise than by the cooperative decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political authority over society and

economy is supposed to belong'.⁴ In this perspective, the vertical boundaries separating states are being replaced by horizontal boundaries separating economic and technical elites from other citizens, and sovereign states are being replaced by sovereign markets.⁵

In the proliferating globalization literature there is no doubt a tendency to exaggerate the extent to which power has slipped away from states to markets. First of all, states may be portrayed as midwives rather than victims of globalization. A number of states are promoting and encouraging rather than constraining the globalization of corporate activity. The opening up of capital markets occurred as a direct result of decisions by a series of governments to deregulate. They may have done so willingly or unwillingly, ceding to pressures from financial interests or trying to prevent international crises, but deregulation was none the less the outcome of political decisions. The changing balance of power between states and markets is thus largely the result of the diffusion of national deregulation policies, the widespread susceptibility of governments to the 'fashion' in economic policy or the 'mood of the time', rather than impersonal forces of globalization above and beyond states. Moreover, the globalization literature has tended to draw an exaggerated picture of state powers in the past in order to claim powerlessness in this day and age.⁶

If anything, the long sweep of history teaches us that the state has proved to be an extraordinarily adaptive type of organization. As we have seen, the modern state emerged from the challenges of military competition and increased trade in the late Middle Ages. European states have since had to respond to new challenges of industrialization, nation-building, and democratization. In the process, they have redefined their purposes and added new functions and institutions while retaining the old ones.⁷ Will they be able to adapt to the challenges of today and tomorrow as well? A negative answer to this question is by no means given, as the 'transformationalists' contend. As a matter of fact, the states of Europe may once again serve as a model for the rest of the world and provide a key to the future.

As alluded to in Chapter 7, the European Union, in its present form, can be seen as a kind of adaptation to globalization. The EU is often taken to be *sui generis*, a unique phenomenon with no historical precedent or counterpart in the contemporary world. Yet it is possible to regard the EU as a harbinger of the future role of the state. Let us pursue that perspective and look for components of such a role, as suggested by the EU experience.

other types of actors as well. In the wake of globalizing markets, traditional notions of diplomacy as state-state activity need to be broadened to include state-firm as well as firm-firm diplomacy.⁸ In addition, the state becomes increasingly engaged in negotiations with the expanding and variegated community of transnational actors and movements, 'activists beyond borders',⁹ which are often lumped together under the label of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). By virtue of their commitment to, and expertise in, a focused set of concerns, NGOs may gain considerable leverage on selected policy issues *vis-à-vis* states, which have to attend to a wide array of demands.¹⁰

As we have seen, the EU has become an arena for interaction between the 'negotiating state' and these other types of actors. The EU experience also illustrates that they enter into a bargaining relationship, characterized by interdependence and the coincidence of common and conflicting interests.¹¹ States need firms to create the economic foundation of their existence, and firms need the predictable environment of a stable state to prosper. States are often dependent on NGOs to reach out 'where the action is' on such issues as protecting the environment, providing development aid or halting the spread of epidemics, whereas NGOs are dependent on states or interstate organizations for the provision of channels of action and, sometimes, funding. Along with the common or complementary interests in the creation of wealth and the solution of certain issues, important conflicting interests obviously enter into the bargaining relationship among states, firms and NGOs. For example, states want to extract as much in taxes as possible, firms prefer to pay as little tax as possible. As the identity of NGOs is often based on opposition to governments, too close collaboration with governments may threaten their autonomy. In short, firms and NGOs sometimes challenge, sometimes supplement the state; but they nearly always act in counterpoint with governmental actors.

While such incipient bargaining relationships are not limited to European states, the peculiarity of the EU is that these various actors tend to interact conjointly in informal networks. It could be argued that throughout history formal organizations have been created in order to discipline and control informal networks exercising unchecked influence, be they families, clans or churches. The modern state is no exception in that regard, and outside the European Union states remain more concerned with controlling networks than with participating in them. The EU member states, by contrast, seem to be following the motto 'if you can't beat them, join them'. This represents an innovation in international relations, which can be taken to illustrate the adaptive capacity, and foreshadow the future role, of the state.

If we situate the state in the context of negotiations in networks, as the EU experience suggests, we may identify its relative bargaining strengths and weaknesses. A tentative, but by no means exhaustive, list of bargaining assets of the contemporary state might focus on network position, sovereignty and information. First, as demonstrated by the EU, states tend to occupy *central positions in policy networks*. In graphic representations of policy networks, with

From dominance to negotiations

The changing role of the state, we concluded in Chapter 5, entails negotiation instead of domination. Rather than claiming absolute authority domestically and exclusive agency externally, the 'negotiating state' mediates between domestic and international and between political and economic interests. As demonstrated graphically by the EU, the shift from domination to negotiation with does not only involve increased cooperation among states but interaction with

points symbolizing organizational nodes and arrows symbolizing connections, states usually constitute central nodes in terms of being reachable from, and able to reach, most other organizations in the network. This 'linking-pin' position makes it difficult for other actors to neglect or bypass the state when negotiating an issue. Secondly, *sovereignty* remains a bargaining asset in transnational networks. As we concluded in Chapter 5, sovereignty still confers on states legal authority which can be exercised to the detriment of other actors' interests or be bargained away in return for influence over others' policies. The EU is a primary example of this. Thirdly, the state still has a certain advantage in the collection and assemblage of *information*, even if it has lost some of its previous preponderance to multinational media conglomerates. The preparation of statistics is typically a state function. In addition, states have diplomatic and intelligence branches which systematically gather information about the international environment. Being well informed is essential in negotiations in networks, and information can be used as a bargaining resource in exchange relations.

By the same token, one can draw up a list of relative weaknesses of the state in network and bargaining terms. For the sake of symmetry, let us highlight three disadvantages under the rubrics of *territoriality*, *decision time* and *intersocietal penetration*. First, states are *territorially bound*, whereas their business and NGO counterparts are transnational in character. By virtue of their presence in many countries, multinational corporations and NGOs are not dependent on any one state. For instance, a firm can exit if it dislikes the policies of a host country; a state cannot run away from its geopolitical situation. Secondly, states – especially the kind of democratic states that predominate in Europe – have *lengthy decision processes*, whereas their counterparts – in particular the actors in globalized financial markets – can make speedy decisions, unrestrained by public opinion or constitutional checks and balances. The contrast between the extreme speed of decisions in the financial markets and the inertia of government decision-making becomes palpable in times of currency crises. Thirdly, in comparison with multinational firms and NGOs, states lack the capacity for what we, for lack of better words, may call *intersocietal penetration*. The institution of sovereignty, it will be recalled, allows the state to make extensive claims of authority within its own society while excluding it from any influence over the societies of other states. To be sure, states have by no means adhered strictly to the principle of non-intervention, but the asymmetry remains that multinational firms and NGOs are vastly more embedded in – and have considerably greater potential to influence – a number of societies.

In sum, a perspective that puts emphasis on states as negotiating entities, participating in transnational networks, yields a more multifaceted and fine-grained picture of the adaptability and changing role of states than the simplistic alternatives of demise or survival dominating the debate between 'transformationalists' and 'sceptics'. In that respect, the EU may be a key to the future of the state more generally.¹²

Problems of accountability

At the same time, the notion of the negotiating state in networks raises thorny questions about democratic values in general, and accountability in particular. Accountability is the touchstone of representative democracy. The government is accountable for its actions before the people in elections at regular intervals. For citizens to be able to make informed judgements of accountability two fundamental requirements must be fulfilled: *transparency*, in the sense that the voter should be fully informed as to what the government has in fact done during its term, and *responsibility*, in the sense that it should be clear to the voter who is responsible for what action. The picture of the changing role of the state, drawn above on the basis of the EU experience, is problematic on both accounts.

Negotiations in networks rarely take place in the open. The accepted wisdom is that effective negotiations require confidentiality and a measure of secrecy, and one of the advantages of informal network structures is precisely their limited visibility. The lack of transparency, associated with negotiations in networks, is therefore a major problem in terms of government accountability before the voters; the heated debate about transparency in the EU testifies to that. Added to the general problem of transparency is the difficulty of ascribing unequivocal responsibility to specific actors for decisions reached through negotiations in networks. Negotiated outcomes imply shared responsibility among a number of actors who have all had to modify their initial positions. Unpopular aspects of the outcome can always be blamed on other actors.

In short, as agency and power become more anonymous, the difficulty of pinning responsibility to individual actors is magnified. Again, the EU provides ample illustrations as to how the traditional image of individual governments being held responsible for discrete policy measures, affecting only citizens of its own state, is eroded by multi-level governance through negotiations in networks. If the efficacy of the system of representative democracy is being strained and eroded in the face of regional and global interconnectedness, what mechanisms could ensure accountability in the new international order?¹³ That question remains unanswered.

Another principal democratic problem concerns the delimitation of a *demos*. Nationalism laid a foundation for modern democracy, in this regard, by defining the *demos* in terms of the nation which, in turn, was to coincide with the state. The *demos* of modern democratic practice thus became territorially bound. If we envisage the future of Europe as negotiation and power sharing between territorial states and non-territorial entities, this seemingly firm foundation begins to crumble. One problem derives from the increased demographic mobility. Voting rights have traditionally been based on birth and citizenship. With a growing number of persons residing and working in other countries than those of their citizenship, this principle raises questions. Why should, say, a Swede, who has worked for many years in the EU

bureaucracy in Brussels, or in a multinational firm in Spain, be entitled to vote in elections in remote Sweden but not in his or her country of residence and work, where political decisions directly affect his or her daily life? This touches on a perhaps even more fundamental problem, which is accentuated by the EU experience: democracy presupposes perfect coincidence between the *demos* with voting rights and the people affected by the resulting policy measures. This forges the link between voting and accountability of judgements. In our era of globalization, however, 'territorial systems of accountability no longer necessarily coincide with the spatial reach of sites of power'.¹⁴ Increasingly voters are affected by decisions made in other states or by other types of actors, on the one hand, and outcomes of negotiations between their own state and other states and actors, on the other. National communities by no means exclusively make and determine decisions and policies for themselves, and governments by no means determine what is appropriate exclusively for their own citizens'.¹⁵ The European Union epitomizes new 'possibilities of governance independent of the existence of a central authority and beyond the territorial congruence of those who govern with those who are subject to governance'.¹⁶ The new realities seem to call for a move away from reliance on a single source of democratic legitimization and accountability. Yet, the unresolved question in the contemporary transformation of European space will be how to define *demos* and retain the fundamentals of democratic governance.

To summarize, the dispersion of power we can note in Europe and the rest of the world does not necessarily entail the withering of the state, as much of the current literature on globalization contends. However, we are witnessing a profound transformation of the state's role, and the state's adaptability to new circumstances, proven by the historical record, is again being tested. The EU experience points to one possible mode of adaptation: the state as a negotiating entity, participating in transnational networks. This invites a discussion of interdependencies, common and conflicting interests, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of states *vis-à-vis* other prominent types of actors, such as multinational corporations and NGOs. A scenario negotiating states in networks calls traditional democratic practices into question. Unresolved problems include how to ensure accountability and how to define the *demos* that might be the foundation of future democratic governance.

The changing geography: does territory matter?

Transportation and communications technology is, in essence, a question of finding technical solutions to the problem of moving goods, people and information. This fundamental problem has been a continuous challenge to human ingenuity, and history abounds with examples of technical innovations that have dramatically altered our geographic scope for action. New opportunities have been created for exploiting natural resources, for producing

goods and services, for managing enterprises, and for improving human living conditions. The correlation between new technology and increased mobility is evident. Diminishing distance-related friction has entailed increased volumes of transportation as well as multiplying and more rapid flows of communication. It is more difficult to evaluate in which ways new technologies have affected, and will continue to affect, the location of industrial plants, settlement patterns and modes of organization. This has been the subject of divergent visions, hopes and apprehensions.

Napoleon did not travel faster than Caesar

At the root of the local self-subsistence and regional isolation of earlier societies lay considerable distance-related friction. Through vertical links, natural resources bound production to specific places. Transport by land was dependent on the physical capacity of animals and people to carry and pull. Information could be transmitted to remote places only through messengers. Navigable waters provided the best form of transportation. Roads were few and primitive.

Over the centuries, human ability to master geographic space changed quite slowly. That Napoleon Bonaparte did not travel faster than Julius Caesar was not merely a figure of speech, but a reality. In the eighteenth century, the ancient Roman roads remained the most trafficable paths south and west of the *limes*, the boundary along the Rhine and the Danube that separated the barbarians in the north and east from the civilized populations in the south and west.

It was only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that a qualitative change in technical range triggered a veritable social revolution. To be sure, even before then there were intermittent advances in the capacity to transport people and goods over long distances, but they were modest in comparison to those set in motion by the industrial revolution.

The Belgian historian Henri Pirenne has distinguished three 'logistic revolutions'. The first took place during the Middle Ages, when new transport links connected previously separated trade systems and cultures. With better vessels, such as Venetian crusader ships and Hanseatic cogues, trade evolved between ports along Europe's major navigable rivers. As political territories grew, it became easier to avert robbery and plundering along transportation routes, over land as well as water. The second logistic revolution connected continents. With the advent of caravels it became easier to carry goods across the seas. The pivot of long-distance trade shifted from the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea to the coasts of the Atlantic and the North Sea. Not only advances in transportation technology account for the expansion of trade, however. The emergence of uniform means of payment, a credit market and banks contributed as well by facilitating commercial transactions. This, in turn, boosted the need for transmitting and processing information. The third logistic revolution began with industrialism in England by the end of the eighteenth century.¹⁷

Technology that transfigures time and space

With industrialism, the technical range began to expand at an accelerating pace. The advent of steamships facilitated rapid transportation of large quantities across the seas, regardless of weather conditions. Railroads linked large territories. This process started around the year 1800, when local railroad tracks and horse-drawn wagons were introduced in the coal district of Newcastle in the northeast of England. A century later, Europe was replete with railroad tracks. For the first time in history, an expansion of technical range came to affect the public at large. People were no longer dependent for their livelihood on local markets and resources. It became possible to move and sustain mass armies. Long-distance travel was no longer the privilege of a small elite.

The invention of the automobile launched another revolution in the transport of people and goods. Its principal advantages had little to do with increasing range or speed, and more to do with the automobile's adaptability to individual travel needs. Air transport can be said to represent the opposite: it has quickly developed into the outstanding means of rapid transportation, while having pronounced nodal network properties. This means that access is provided only through a few far-apart nodes. The radical impact of automobiles and aircraft became apparent in Europe only after the Second World War. Later, when motor traffic started causing congestion in narrow city streets and on overcrowded roads, railroads experienced a sort of renaissance. Overcrowding in the air has also contributed to new investment in express trains along major traffic routes.

The advent of railways in the early nineteenth century undermined earlier perceptions of time and space. As railroad traffic effectively shrank the distances between areas, the incongruous local times throughout Europe were exposed. Before the railroad era, time was 'variegated', based on astronomical phenomena. This meant that places and regions at different latitudes had different local times, determined by the position of the sun. In the 1840s, the railroad companies of Great Britain introduced uniform railroad times, which until the end of the century pertained only to railroad traffic and schedules. As the railroad network grew denser, affecting more and more places and regions, the need to replace 'variegated' time with 'uniform' time became apparent. In 1880, railroad times became the standard throughout Great Britain, and in 1884 an international conference coordinated national standard times and divided the world into the time zones that are still in effect today. While contributing to making time uniform, railroads punctuated space. A pattern of discrete points linked by more or less straight lines was superimposed on a continuous geographic space. 'The railroads know only departure, pause and arrival in places that are normally far apart. With the space in between, which they contemptuously crisscross and condescend only to glance at, they create no connection.' These words were written in 1840.¹⁸ The transfiguration of time and space experienced by nineteenth-century travellers seems minor in comparison to present-day realities.

The cost of transporting goods has been reduced to a greater extent than other costs that businesses attempt to minimize, and transportation times have shrunk. One result of this development is that a significant part of the manufacturing industry has become 'footloose', with wide options of location and relocation. Another development is that the transportation sector has expanded dramatically. Goods are transported between producers, suppliers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers regardless of distance, and regardless of the fact that substitutes are available closer at hand. Congestion and 'traffic infarct' in large cities and along highways is the price paid for this enhanced mobility.

At the utmost limit of mobility

Even more dramatic is the history of the range of the media, the channels for conveying information. For thousands of years, information travelled only as fast as the horse or the ship. In the 1840s, when Samuel Morse had invented his alphabet and telegraph services were initiated, it took ten weeks to dispatch a message back and forth between London and Bombay. In the 1870s, by which time telegraph wires linked much of the world, it took only four minutes.

Before the turn of the century, the invention of the telephone made it possible to exchange spoken messages over long distances. Later refinements of telecommunications technology, such as mobile phones and facsimile machines, have increased the ease and speed of exchanging information. With computers in networks there are virtually no limits to the transfer and storage of information, whether as text, image or sound. Firms and other organizations today have built internal computer networks that connect their different sites. In principle, the physical distance between these sites is of no relevance. Such networks can also link up independent but collaborating companies, thus blurring traditional notions of firms.

Modern information technology promises limitless range. Today, the daily operations of complex transportation systems, multilateral corporations and financial markets rely on telecommunications and computers. Key actors in these spheres with global range may have the impression of sharing the same locality. Manuel Castells, for instance, speaks in paradoxical terms of 'timeless time' and 'space of flows'.¹⁹

The development of mass communication has been no less dramatic. In earlier eras, information could reach a great number of people simultaneously only if these people assembled, for example in the amphitheatre, the agora, the forum, the piazza, or the marketplace. Only with the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century could the written word start reaching larger audiences. Even if newspapers were being published in many parts of Europe by the seventeenth century, the major expansion of newspaper distribution took place in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. In early industrial society, daily newspapers became the most important medium for news, debates and political propaganda, with a circulation that affected nearly every household.

Radio transmissions were initiated in the 1910s. Early television broadcasts took place in London and Berlin in 1936. Today the broadcasting media occupy an exceptional position in mass communications, by virtue of the speed with which identical information can reach different audiences around the globe. Information spread via broadcasting media is public and unidirectional. It is not directed to any particular recipient, and it does not allow for immediate feedback. In the context of a society without any distance-related friction, it is important to recall that all forms of mass communications are 'asymmetrical'. The senders can reach out to multiple audiences, whereas the recipient can only tune in to one channel at the time. This asymmetry is illustrated most dramatically by television. Reporters, anchormen and artists appear before a symbiotic audiences who, for their part, may experience a sense of presence and community with the performers. Indeed, one-way communication and technical reach make for individual fame and stardom in our age.

The French urban planner Paul Virilio is one of many who have argued that accelerating speed is the governing principle of social change. In his book *Vitesse et politique*, Virilio portrays technology as our destiny, and technological progress as an inevitable incentive for change. The history of science and technology, he claims, is a history of acceleration. Technological development has led to, or soon will lead to, a world where physical distance is of no relevance. Before long, it will be possible to travel between Paris and Tokyo in less time than it takes many people to commute from home to work in a large urban region today. Democracy was born when citizens gathered in the centre of the city, in an agora or a forum. New technology has given rise to medial proximity with no sense of physical distance or space. The public sights and sounds of the broadcasting media, transmitted at the speed of magnetic waves, that is, 300,000 kilometres per second, have replaced the public marketplace. Paul Virilio regards the development as alarming, but inevitable. In a 1991 interview, he stated: 'Either we do away with technology or we accept acceleration until we have reached the utmost limits of mobility, that is, the speed of light. Beyond that there is nothing, unless Einstein was mistaken and theory of relativity is incorrect and there do, in fact, exist superluminous speeds.'²⁰

The lack of friction and restrictions does not entail only advantages, but also causes a new set of problems. For instance, financial markets in our electronic age are often blamed for reacting too hastily and unreflectingly. Opinion polls, registering temporary swings in the electorate, may influence long-term political decisions. Automation and remote control eliminate the 'social friction' that is an essential part of negotiations, discussions and conversations. Without such friction, it is more difficult to reach prudent and pragmatic decisions. Individual experience becomes a less important input. The possibility for individuals to control, discover errors and inform diminishes. Reduced friction entails more uncertainty, unexpected outcomes and risks.²¹

Liberated space and settlement patterns

Modern means of transportation and communication would seem to make production and settlement less bound to places and limited regional environments. And no doubt reduced distance-related friction has entailed a broader range of options concerning location. With more alternatives, mobility can be expected to increase. Yet this freedom of choice has not been widely used either by firms or individuals. Rather, it seems to have facilitated concentration.

Today choices of location are influenced by access to transportation routes and network nodes. Air routes and express trains connect cities in 'nodal landscapes', whereas today's 'remote areas' are those without railway stations, located along railroad tracks on which express trains pass, and those far from airports. It is well known that the advantages of large-scale production become more significant with increasing technical range. The theoretical literature refers to 'agglomerative advantages' and 'external local effects', which come to the fore in a society where the distance-related friction is insignificant.²² Thus, we find that firms tend to cluster in strategic locations.

What about individual freedom of choice? Are there human, rather than technological, factors that tie individuals to specific geographic environments and make certain places and areas more attractive than others? In our attempt to address this question, 'social communication' and 'human reach' are key concepts.

Terms of social communication

The previously used term 'technical range' can be contrasted with 'human reach'. Range implies technical scope, the possibilities of, and limits to, moving goods, people and messages. Reach, on the other hand, is contingent on the biological and mental capacity of human beings, the ability to include the surrounding world in a mental sphere of interest. Human reach changes through personal experiences and incoming information.

Given the remarkable development of technical range, it is easy to forget that human reach has by no means been transformed correspondingly. The physical and mental capacities of human beings are not much different from a few generations ago. If anything, without technical aids, our physical aptitude would most likely be lower today. It is also questionable whether our ability to handle information has grown significantly. There is nothing to indicate that the present generation would have greater sensory and perceptual capacities – or different gifts for empathy, identity, involvement and trust – than previous ones.

The verb 'reach' means to extend, stretch out, grasp, and achieve communication. As a noun, it denotes scope and something attainable, including comprehension. As such, 'reach' is widely used in phenomenological research. The Swedish geographer Torsken Hägerstrand describes reach thus:

To say that something is within a person's reach refers not only to his/her being able to reach it in a purely physical sense. It includes economic, cognitive and emotional dimensions as well. Figuratively speaking, each person is during his/her lifetime embedded in a *reach space* that in various ways stretches sideways, backward to the past, and forward toward desired futures. What is contained in the space depends on the individual's own capacity and biography, but also on what is offered by the environment in terms of resources to draw from and recipients to give to.²³

To understand human reach we need to draw on insights from information theory, physiology and psychology concerning the human ability to process and convey information. All information that reaches us is screened and classified. Every second, individuals sift out millions of information bits, thus creating organization and order out of the confusing mass of information and laying the foundation of human *consciousness*. It is this screening process that creates consciousness, not the information *per se*. Consciousness is filtered, organized and assimilated information. At any given moment we perceive only a fraction of the information that is bombarding our sensory organs. The 'bandwidth' of our consciousness is far narrower than that of our senses. At the same time, consciousness is remarkably versatile. The bandwidth for 'internal' handling of information is a thousand times greater than that which our senses can utilize to receive 'external' impulses. An extensive thought process takes place in the nervous system of each human being, a process of association, sorting, organization and filtering, in which new information blends with memories, dreams and emotions. People's internal mental worlds contain a wealth of information. By contrast, the amount of information that can be exchanged between complex mental worlds is small. The channel that is available for this process has a very narrow bandwidth. Language is insufficient to convey the major share of our experiences. The effect of our efforts to transmit information depends, to a certain extent, on the clarity of the signals we send; but even more on the distance between mental worlds. Social communication is most effective between individuals whose mental worlds have been 'formatted' analogously over lengthy periods of time.²⁴

These observations concerning human consciousness have geographic implications. They draw attention to the fact that human thought requires boundaries. To draw boundaries can be viewed as a mental self-defence mechanism. At the same time, we need boundaries to share our views and experiences with others and to determine our identity, in terms of being able to distinguish 'us' from 'them'. As pointed out in Chapter 2, physical proximity, likeness and linkage are three fundamental principles underlying our drawing of boundaries.

In short, boundaries do not only refer to the physical terrain but are drawn in mental maps as well. *Realm of experience and epistemic community* are some

of the concepts used to describe areas within which people are united by a common language, religious community, a collective history, shared memories and mutual trust. The French speak of *sémiosphère*, the Germans of *Lehrgemeinschaft*. These realms or communities can easily be conceptualized as territorial categories – places, regions and countries. Yet, as discussed in previous chapters, there is every indication that a sense of belonging and loyalty can be nurtured in networks as well. However, as indicated in Chapters 8 and 9, several factors suggest that place, neighbourhood and region will continue to play important roles as realms of experience and epistemic communities.

While technical range stands for rapid change, human reach, personal networks of contact and epistemic communities represent remarkably tenacious structures. These are passed on from generation to generation through upbringing and education. Inherited knowledge is preserved in texts and images in our archives, museums, libraries, statues and memorials. Resting on the experiences of overlapping generations, human reach fosters local anchorage and regional identity. Our daily patterns of movement and dense social networks reinforce the importance of our immediate environment. If an individual resides in a certain area for a relatively long time, the place and the neighbourhood become his / her realm of experience. This realm includes not only social and cultural ties, but also the physical environment. During childhood and adolescence, experiences of place are likely to have a particularly strong influence on the development of an individual's psyche. In recent years, questions related to the emergence and preservation of regional identity and sense of place have attracted renewed interest among scholars.²⁵

Our need for conversation

Our discussion of social communication points to our need for conversation. No other form of communication offers the same advantages. Weak or ambiguous signals can be amplified and clarified through the back-and-forth flow of information. Only within sight can kinetic and paralinguistic signals be sent and interpreted. When more than two individuals need to communicate, the advantages of direct conversation become even more apparent. Participants are then able to observe and interpret not only the speaker but also the reactions of the listeners. Technical aids cannot convey the richness of impressions offered by direct contacts. All known media filter information, and mass media reduce communication to a one-way process.

Here we can trace one of the great paradoxes of our time. Modern, computer-backed information systems make it possible to process virtually boundless amounts of information. Via telecommunications and media, information can be transferred at the speed of light across any distance. Yet at the same time, the need for consultation and direct person-to-person contacts has increased. Today, more and more businessmen and civil servants devote more and more of their time to meetings and other contact activities. Travel to various types of meetings, even over great distances, has surged dramatically in recent years,

despite undeniable costs in terms of money, time and effort. Modern society, characterized by far-reaching division of labour and specialization, is becoming ever more complex and less transparent. In a world of fragmented knowledge and expertise, conferences and meetings are means of overcoming uncertainty, of combining bits of information into a comprehensive basis for decision-making.

Well-structured, routine information can be transferred rapidly and effectively via telephone, facsimile and computers in networks. Such information transfers are today used in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from large-scale manufacturing to speedy check-in at airports. These flows of information are often unidirectional and follow established, formal channels. There is a low degree of uncertainty (Figure 10.1).

Technical aids are not as useful in dealing with questions involving *uncertainty, unpredictability and surprise*. Thus, negotiation, reconnaissance, renewal and other search processes require information exchange via face-to-face contacts and group conversation. Media, on the other hand, are most suitable for transferring information *within* established social networks, characterized by a low degree of uncertainty. They cannot replace direct contacts between strangers or *between* networks, which are typified by uncertainty.²⁶

The archipelago: the metaphor of our times

Existing global networks would hardly be feasible without almost boundless technical range. On the other hand, the prevalence of local anchorage would be unintelligible without reference to the potency and limitations of human reach. The overall picture that emerges is one of fragmented space, of an *archipelago* of scattered urban regions, connected via networks of different kinds.

As discussed above, it is the interplay of several factors that creates this picture. Modern transportation systems contribute to the fragmentation of geographical space, whereas strong agglomerative forces favour concentration. Firms and institutes of research and culture erect buildings and are embedded in local and regional environments where people live and work, but without links with transnational flows of knowledge, capital and ideas they would face stagnation. Hence networks grow that transcend national and other geographic boundaries. The interplay of global forces of change and regional ambitions, which is essential to our material prosperity, is made possible through the links that connect a kaleidoscopic world of home bases and creative places.

Quo vadis, Europe?




FIGURE 10.1 Purposes, characteristics and forms of information transfer

Our triologue has not yielded any hard and fast predictions as to which mode of organizing European space will prevail in the future. Nor was that our intention from the outset. Rather, we have tried to provide a set of conceptual tools, which hopefully will help the reader to better understand the multi-layered organizational complexity characterizing contemporary Europe. To refer back to the metaphors used in Chapter 1, we have offered a whole set of floodlights to avoid leaving parts of the stage in the shade or in the dark, or – to use a different metaphor – a variety of nets to catch different fish in different ponds.

Our main message, therefore, is to accept and welcome complexity and variability rather than relying on any *one* model or theory. Different lines of development coexist in today's Europe. In that sense the present is not that different from the past. In fact, it could be argued that the multiplicity and variability of organizational forms may have contributed to the dynamism that accounts for the relative success of the European continent throughout history. And, as we have seen, this complexity and variability can be captured in a 'territorial field of tension' which, though of a general nature, may look somewhat different at different times and in different parts of the world.

The state constituted the benchmark in our analysis of the contemporary 'territorial field of tension'. We have identified a number of challenges to the sovereign territorial state. One can be subsumed under the label of 'globalization'. Its determinants are chiefly technological and economic in nature. As a result of the revolution in transportation and information technology, ever

larger shares of business, research and development can be conducted in transnational networks that are beyond the control of individual states. The EU, as we have argued, can be seen as an incipient effort to create a political form for globalized space.

Another tendency, proceeding in parallel, can be labelled 'regionalization'. Regional proximity and local anchorage have not lost their significance in a globalized world. In large measure, identification needs rather than material forces, human reach rather than technical range, underlie this tendency. As the bonds with the national centre are weakened, regional and local self-identities tend to be strengthened. This trajectory does not contradict the globalization trend. On the contrary, when mobility across national boundaries increases, the significance of local identities seems to grow as well. In a world of global flows of capital, people, ideas and technology specific local and regional features become competitive advantages. Regional and local organizations are emerging as international actors not only economically but in the political arena as well. The cross-border regions, regional representation and regional lobbying in the EU are prominent examples of this. In short, globalization and regionalization tendencies interact and shape each other, which has given rise to such synthesized labels as 'glocalization' and 'fragmegration'.²⁷

Our conclusions as historian, political scientist and geographer have one thing in common: a caveat not to forget the limitations of human nature and the inertia of basic human values, as we live through an era of dramatic and unprecedented changes in technical range. Depending on disciplinary background, we may emphasize different aspects of human reach, be it identity, democratic values or a sense of place. But we do agree that mental structures can prove to be barriers to rapid technological and organizational change.

We are also in agreement that these complementary processes of spatial integration and fragmentation do not necessarily herald the end of the state. Our analysis has emphasized the adaptability of the state in the past and the changing role of the state today. As we have seen, the 'negotiating state' retains certain advantages in its interactions with other actors. And one should not forget that the same states that promoted globalization through a series of liberalization and deregulation measures may in the future act to restrain that process and close their borders. To be sure, most observers believe that states are no longer able to reverse the process – the globalization genie cannot be put back into the bottle. But the political arsenal of the state has not yet been exhausted.

We have suggested the network metaphor to capture the essence of the three simultaneous processes of globalization, regionalization and state adaptation. The European Union is the primary example of a multi-level political organization based on networks that include representatives of states as well as subnational and supranational entities. The network metaphor induces us to view territory, organization and interorganizational relations in a new light. Moreover, the archipelago metaphor sensitizes us to constellations that have yet to find their political expression.

Our principal argument, in short, is that theories and conceptions of Europe which privilege the state at the expense of other organizational forms are of limited value in trying to understand the dynamism and complexity of European realities today, in the past or in the future. By providing a multitude of conceptual tools and perspectives from different disciplines we hope to have contributed, however marginally, to a new state of mind. We also hope to have avoided the three most common mistakes people make when thinking about the future.²⁸ The first is to assume that the future will be entirely different from the past; the second is to believe that it will be just the same; and the third, and most serious, mistake is not to think about it at all.

NOTES

1. Frederick S. Tipson, as quoted in James N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 341.
2. Daniel Bell, as quoted in Mathew Horstman and Andrew Marshall, *After the Nation-State: Citizens, Tribalism and the New World Disorder* (London: Harper Collins, 1995), 187.
3. See Robert W. Cox, 'The Crisis in World Order and the Challenge to International Organization', *Cooperation and Conflict* 29 (1994), 99–113; Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, *Approaches to World Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 527–9.
4. Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4.
5. Peter Dombrowski and Richard W. Mansbach, 'From Sovereign States to Sovereign Markets' (paper presented at the 38th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, March 1997).
6. See Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 188–212.
7. Cf. Ibid., 9.
8. Susan Strange, 'Rethinking Structural Change in the International Political Economy: States, Firms, and Diplomacy', in *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order*, eds Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (London: Macmillan, 1994).
9. This is the expression used by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).
10. Cf. Ann Marie Clark, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society', *Journal of International Affairs*, 48 (1995), 510.
11. These elements – the coincidence of cooperative and conflictual elements in combination with interdependent decisions – are commonly included in definitions of 'bargaining situations'. See, for example, Christer Jönsson, *Communication in International Bargaining* (London: Pinter, 1990), 2.
12. Of course, this does not imply that the EU in its entirety is likely to serve as a model for the world.
13. David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 138.
14. Anthony McGrew, 'Globalization and Territorial Democracy: An Introduction', in *The Transformation of Democracy?*, ed. Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 12–13.

15 Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, 16–17.

16 Markus Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch, 'The Transformation of Governance in the European Union' (paper presented at the Fourth Biennial International Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Charleston, SC, May 1995), 5.

17 Henri Pirenne, *Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe* (London: Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1949); Henri Pirenne, *Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1952).

18 W. Schivelbusch, *Geschichte der Eisenbahnreise: Industrialisierung von Raum und Zeit im 19. Jahrhundert* (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1977).

19 Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), Chapters 6 and 7.

20 Paul Virilio, *Vitesse et politique* (Paris: Hachette/Reclus, 1977); Paul Virilio, *L'espace critique* (Paris: Hachette/Reclus, 1984); 'Full fart mot evigheten', *Dagens Nyheter*, 8 December 1991.

21 For a multifaceted overview of different forms of friction and their significance, see Nordal Åkerman, *The Necessity of Friction: Nineteen Essays on a Vital Force* (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1993).

22 Gunnar Törnqvist, 'Studier i industrilokalisering', *Meddelanden från Geografiska institutionen vid Stockholms universitet* No. 153 (Stockholm, Department of Geography, Stockholm University, 1963).

23 Torsten Hägerstrand, 'Att skapa sammankhang i mänskans värld – problemet', in *Att forma regional framtid* (Stockholm: Liber, 1978).

24 See, for example, Tor Norretranders, *Märk världen: En bok om vetenskap och intuition* (Stockholm: Bonnier Alba, 1993). Cf. Gunnar Törnqvist, *Renaissans för regioner: Om tekniken och den sociala kommunikationens vilkor* (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1998).

25 Cf. Antti Paasi, 'The Institutionalization of Regions: A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Emergence of Regions and the Constitution of Identity', *Fennia*, 164 (1986): 1, 105–46; Kay Anderson and Fay Gale (eds), *Inventing Places: Studies in Cultural Geography* (London: Longman, 1992).

26 For empirical documentation, see Gunnar Törnqvist, *Contact Systems and Regional Development* (Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1970).

27 See Rosenau, *Along the Domestic–Foreign Frontier*, 38.

28 Cf. Horstman and Marshall, *After the Nation-State*, 270.

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